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John Dewey's most intense period of
work in philosophy of education during and
immediately after the Chicago years culminated
in Democracy and Education in 1916. After
that, he produced fewer writings on education,
but is still remembered for The Sources of a
Science of Education, Experience and Education,
and numerous articles in journals.
Yet the
longest account of philosophy of education after
Democracy and Education is little known. This
is a course of lectures on educational philosophy
given at the University of Cincinnati in 1937,
two decades after Democracy and Education . A
stenographic record of the lectures was made,
which consists of 237 double-spaced typewritten
pages. Two earlier sets of lectures in philosophy
of education have survived — one given in 1896,
the other in 1899. (The 1896, 1899, and 1937
lectures will be referenced as LI, L2, and L3,
respectively.) The 1937 course was intensive:
Dewey lectured for 5 days a week for two weeks
in the 1937 Summer School, one lecture a day on
two days, two lectures on each of the remaining
8 days, for a total of 18 lectures, June 7 to June
11, and June 14 to June 18. (For purposes of
reference, the lectures are numbered 1-18; e.g.,
L3,15 means the 1937 lectures, lecture 15. The
division into sub-headings was made by the
present writer.)
One change that had taken place since
1916 was the growth of philosophy of education
as a distinct field of study in the United States.
Prior to 1916, Herman Harrell Home's
Philosophy of Education in 1904 was probably
the first textbook by an American author. This
was followed by John Angus Macvannel's
Outline of a Course in the Philosophy of
Education and G. E. Partridge's Genetic
Philosophy of Education, both published in

1912. Other writers had entered the scene whose
writings were on Dewey's reading list in 1937.
Among them were W. H. Kilpatrick's Education
for a Changing Civilization, Boyd H. Bode's
Modern Educational Theories, and John Childs'
Education
and
the
Philosophy
of
Experimental ism.
Perhaps the most striking difference
between L3, on the one side, and LI, L2, and
Democracy and Education on the other, can be
seen in the place devoted to a discussion of
philosophy and philosophy of education. In LI
and L2 Dewey pays little direct attention to
discussing the nature of philosophy of education
but may be said to "do" philosophy of education;
while in Democracy and Education he "does"
philosophy of education for 23 chapters, then
discusses the nature of its subject matter in
Chapter 24 in relation to philosophy itself.
However, in 1937, he begins the course by
devoting the first lecture to the nature of
philosophy and the second to the nature of
philosophy of education. He explains this way
of beginning the course by saying, "I suppose it
ought to begin with something a little more
concrete, but this preliminary discussion about
philosophy in general, the philosophy of
education in particular, seemed to be rather
necessary, sort of a framework for the course."
About his preliminary discussion, Dewey advises
the students not to take it too seriously but, at the
same time, "don't forget about it." It is to be
used in later discussions "to go back to to be
filled out." "After all," he says, "it is philosophy
in its bearings upon educational problems that I
am going to discuss."
In beginning his discussion of the nature
of philosophy, Dewey asks what there is about
philosophy that is not futile, not a purely
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intellectual
exercise,
and
replies
that
philosophizing is a form of reflective thought
that comes about in response to social problems.
The further question to explore is why are there
problems that require philosophic inquiry distinct
from scientific inquiry?
Generally speaking, Dewey holds,
philosophy arises in a conflict between wellingrained customs, traditions, and institutions in
a social group, and new or unaccustomed ways
of responding to those ingrained customs. When
settled conditions continue for long periods and
become
fairly static,
there
is
little
philosophizing; when different beliefs or changes
in conditions are introduced, old static conditions
become unsettled, and problems
arise.
Philosophy is made up of attempts to mediate
between the previously settled and the now
unsettled.
Whatever is customary, traditional,
settled in a group Dewey calls the common sense
of the group. It is what "the different members
of the group take for granted, that is, what they
accept without much thought, accept it because it
is there . . . all the members of the group are
influenced by it, tend to hold it in common." Put
differently, the beliefs that are held in common
are the "sense" of the group. The impact of
modern science has had an unsettling impact on
what was earlier common sense.
Dewey
contrasts his conception of philosophy as seeking
action that aims to mediate between the
previously settled common sense and that which
unsettles common sense, with conceptions of
philosophy that "attempt to get a final ultimate
absolute knowledge of the universe as a
complete whole." He has little to say about the
conceptions that attempt to gain "final ultimate
absolute knowledge."
Finally, in his opening lecture Dewey
turns to the question, Why do we need
philosophy, since the development of the
sciences appears to take over the province of
what had previously been philosophy?
If
philosophy is another form of knowledge, then
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the development of the sciences would probably
make philosophy extinct. Yet there is more in
life than knowledge, Dewey says - there is
living itself. And an important part of living is
the raising of questions about what to do with
knowledge.
For example, "we need human
beings that have to form principles and aims and
that have to change the value of this end over
against that purpose
. . . that have aims in life both as individuals and
as groups." In short, philosophy deals with the
question of aims and values. "Philosophy in my
mind can never be merged in science just
because of the fact that as human beings we are
moved to action, not by knowledge alone but by
knowledge in connection with our desires, aims,
purposes, and conceptions of what is
worthwhile."
The Nature of Philosophy of Education
In L3,2 Dewey moves from a discussion
of philosophy to philosophy of education. He
thinks that education is more intimately
connected with the social conditions from which
philosophy emerges than any other institution.
He refers to Chapter 24 in Democracy and
Education where the nature of philosophy of
education is discussed, pointing out that
philosophy in its origins in ancient Greece was
connected closely with educational problems.
"Education," he says, "is the chief social
instrumentality for forming a type of human
beings that carry on the beliefs and traditions of a
community." He goes on to refer to two facts in
juxtaposition with one another: (1) the
conservative character of the school; and (2) the
changes in social conditions that have forced
themselves onto the schools. This shows, he
argues, that schools have had to face the problem
of the adjustment of older types of schools,
subject matters, and methods to changing social
conditions.
At the same time, new subject
matters tend to become dispersive, leading to the
need to find ways of unifying them. The task of
philosophy of education is to reflect on the
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existing situation and attempt to locate and
describe the sources of the conflict out of which
problems arise, and then to form ideas of ways
in which unity may be brought about. "First," he
says, "to see the school situation in the light of
the larger social situation, and then secondly to
form an idea of the way in which the school may
serve better in the direction of social forces and
conditions in solving the social problems."
Going on to say that this is "a general
formal statement," Dewey attempts to make it
more concrete by talking about what philosophy
of education can and cannot do for the teacher.
What it cannot do, Dewey says, is to give
teachers "practical recipes" for teaching better.
What it should do "is to enable the teacher or the
school administrator to see the special tasks of
school work in a larger and longer perspective,
take them out of the narrow day by day setting
and place them in some kind of a larger
intellectual and moral scheme, enlarge the
horizon, broaden the context, the sense of the
context in which these detailed questions and
problems arise." He illustrates this idea by
discussing a "conflict of ends and values
between the specific and the general." He refers
to Bode and Kilpatrick who emphasize the
development of "attitudes" or "dispositions" as
being a more important aim than acquiring
specific information. Yet Dewey points out that
it is important not to oppose these aims to one
another; rather we need to understand that
concrete skills and bodies of information are
means for the creation of general attitudes.
Eventually Dewey discusses another
conflict that results in a philosophical problem —
the relation between theory and practice. He
notes that much popular literature connects
"practical" education with being successful in
one's occupation, and tends to connect
"practical" with "useful." Instead, Dewey argues
for "the necessity of broadening the concept of
practice and practical to include different
factors, human well being, human welfare."

The Theoretical and the Practical:
Relating
Child and Curriculum
In L3,3 Dewey considers the relationship
between the theoretical and the practical. He
acknowledges the common tendency to separate
theory and practice, a dualism that Dewey wants
us to get over. "The most fundamental problem
in life," he says, "individually and collectively,
is to relate theory and practice so that practice is
intelligent, embodies ideas that are broad and
comprehensive as possible, while ideas, theories,
beliefs . . . organize, unify our practical
activities." Dewey mentions some of the "splits"
in education: between subjects held to be good
for intellectual discipline and those that are held
to be of practical value; between the
"vocational" and the "academic"; between
"pure" and "applied" science; and between the
"humanistic" and the "scientific."
In this context Dewey returns to his
earlier point that one task of philosophy of
education is to locate conflicts that cause
problems that education needs to face; or that
reflective
thinking
"is
investigation,
examination, turning things over, and we don't
inquire excepting where there is a question."
What philosophy of education can do for us is to
make us more aware of underlying problems.
Dewey raises the question, what is
education? He responds by saying that he is not
going to try and give a definition of education at
this point, holding that valuable definitions come
at the close of a discussion; they are conclusions
of inquiry, rather than beginnings. The present
discussion of what education is is not "an
attempt to give a final definition but rather to
indicate some of the factors that enter into it in a
way that gives a kind of outline map, a series of
pointer signs." Then he discusses two related
factors at length. The first is that education is a
process of motivating individuals' original
natures and tendencies. Beginning with babies'
"normal tendencies" education must build on
them, "to modify them, to give them a turn, a
direction they don't have originally and don't
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have when they are left to themselves." Thus
Dewey makes explicit the idea that children
cannot be "left to themselves," but need the help
of persons of more mature experience. The
second and related factor in educating the young
is that "giving direction to them leads to certain
results — takes the form of habit formation."
Dewey tries to make it clear that what he means
by this is a wide sense of habit, that which
includes habits of desire, of purpose, of
judgment. The aim is for such habits to lead
youngsters to be able to judge what is
appropriate or inappropriate in certain situations.
These are more important than merely "external"
ways of behaving, for they are the consequence
of internalizing ways of feeling and thinking.
With respect to the acquisition of special skills,
such as in language and arithmetic, Dewey
argues that these are more meaningful if they are
acquired as part of activities of desiring, having
purposes, and making judgments than if they are
memorized apart from such activities.
Dewey's refusal to give a definition of
education in favor of introducing certain
"factors" is a departure from LI, L2, and
Democracy and Education . In all three he
defined education as the reconstruction of
experience: In LI,2 as a point of departure for
the rest of the lectures; in L2, following a lecture
in which he discussed interest, discipline,
information, and culture; and in Democracy and
Education
in the chapter on "Education as
Conservative and Progressive," where he
emphasizes the idea that the character of
education that reconstruction of experience
requires
is fundamentally different in
conservative and progressive societies.
In L3,4 Dewey returns to a matter
introduced on the previous day, about teachers
giving direction to children's original tendencies.
The point is that we have to pay attention to
them, attempt to find out "what the pupil brings
with him that the teacher may utilize, and . . .
how they are to be developed and transformed."
In the course of this discussion Dewey refers to
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his earlier The Child and the Curriculum,
pointing out that it is the business of the teacher
to view students' existing habits, skills, and
knowledge as potentialities, as "powers that are
to be put to use." The teacher's problem "is to
bring about an interaction . . . between the
powers which the pupil brings with him which
includes all of his interests, all of his habits,
skills, knowledge and t h o u g h t . . . or at least that
part of him which is relevant to the particular
subject matter so that . . . some kind of
transaction takes place." In this way child-andcurriculum becomes a working relationship, not
a mere "addition" of curriculum to child.
Cumulative Activity and Growth
In L3,6 Dewey comments on some of the
references on his reading list, saying that it
doesn't make much difference which books are
read; the important thing is to make connections
between them and the subject matter of his
lectures. He points to Harold Rugg's Culture and
Education in America and Rugg and Ann
Shumaker's Child Centered Schools as being
"partly in line with the general tendency of the
lectures and partly in opposition." No doubt the
opposition lay in their emphasis on "childcentered" schools as compared with Dewey's
efforts to find a unity of child and society. In
addition, he refers to works giving accounts of
schools that attempted to carry out in practice
some of the ideas in his lectures; among them are
articles in the Progressive Education journal, his
and Evelyn Dewey's Schools of Tomorrow, and
the recently-published book on the University of
Chicago Laboratory School, The Dewey School
by Mayhew and Edwards. He says that Bode's
Conflicting
Psychologies
of Learning
is
especially relevant to the connection between
ideas already discussed and "the special problem
of general training or transfer, carrying over from
one subject to another." He approaches the
problem by asking what intellectual conditions
would provide a reason to expect transfer. His
reply is, "if there is a certain developing
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continuous activity where the different . . .
stages . . . are consciously related to an end in
view." Dewey elaborates further on what he
means by a cumulative activity, saying it is when
one stage leads to the next and that is a
consequence of what had gone before. It is when
those engaged in the activity "consciously
observe the relation of what they were doing at
the successive stages to the final end" that we
have reason to think that "general intelligence"
has had a hand in the activity, and "transfer from
the intellectual standpoint" has been involved.
Summing up, "unless thinking and judgment
enter into the problem of the activity there is no
reason to expect any transfer," except by
accident. Dewey says the cumulative activity of
stimulus and response must be transformed into a
means-consequences activity. This takes place
when stimulus-response is not merely a
consecutive reaction, but one in which
observation of conditions and actions are
consciously related to an end in view, and
actions are deliberately performed as means to
the consequences that are actually achieved.
Dewey's characterization of a meansconsequences activity is a way of talking about
growth. Dewey refers his students to an article
by Bode, who criticized the conception of
education as growth, by saying that it does not
give any criterion for growth, inasmuch as a
burglar can develop into a better burglar, a
gangster can "grow" into a better gangster, and
so on. Dewey asks whether this constitutes a
fundamental objection to the idea of education as
growth, or is something the matter with Bode's
interpretation?
The next day (L3,7) Dewey
returns to Bode's objection, and begins by saying
that "there is no such thing as one completely
isolated line or mode of development." If we
take the example of a burglar who has developed
into a better burglar, we need to understand that
it is difficult to imagine anyone who is nothing
but a burglar. A burglar has potentialities to
develop in other directions. "The real question,"
Dewey continues,
"is whether
growth,

development in the direction of being a burglar
will assist or retard the development in other
directions." Development as the end cannot be
limited to one line of growth. If development
into a better burglar is the single end and it limits
development in other directions — e.g., becoming
a better parent, or a better citizen — "then that
particular instance is not in accord with the idea
that growth or development is the continual end."
Dewey sums up his reply to Bode's criticism in
this way: "If you really believe that growth or
development is the end you have got to take it in
a broad and inclusive sense and not limit it to one
isolated line of development excluding the effect
and the bearing of that upon development in
other directions."
Dewey moves on to discuss "all-around
development," by which he means, not the
development of everything at the same time, but
a continuing growth in which certain activities
predominate at certain times, yet "limit on them
falls into place" in ways such that they can
become means to other developing activities.
For example, "receptivity," instead of involving a
passive attitude on the part of students, is "a
necessary function which itself involves a kind
of activity." As an example, he says that it
requires activity to really listen to what other
people are saying, to take in what they are
saying. One who cannot do this limits his own
growth. Reading is another example if the reader
is receptive, has "what we call the open mind," a
willingness to take in.
In both examples,
receptivity involves an activity of taking - not a
passive receiving but an active taking.
The Nature of Experience: Heredity and
Environment
In L3,8 Dewey discusses the question,
what is experience? He refers to the empirical
movement in modern philosophy which
developed in opposition to the rationalistic
philosophy.
Francis Bacon
emphasized
beginning with first hand experiences of
sensations and observations over against general
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participation and common activities by which
educators establish a more democratic method of
control. Democracy, Dewey insists, "is radical
because of its insistence upon democratic means
to attain democratic ends." The question arises,
Suppose the democratic faith "becomes smitten,"
should it hope to win out in the long run by
means of persuasion?
Is it permissible for
democracy to use force in a struggle with nondemocracy? Dewey's reply is, "if one doesn't
have an absolutistic philosophy then one couldn't
be an absolutistic pacifist." Although democracy
must emphasize methods of inquiry and
persuasion, if the occasion arises, proponents of
democracy will have to fight for their ideals.
Dewey then responds to the criticism that
learning everything through experience "tends to
weaken our imaginative faculty" by turning to a
discussion of the place of art in experience. This
turns on the question, Is art a "normal necessity"
of growth of experience or is it an "expression"?
Here Dewey reminds his class of appreciating
the value of completing an experience, carrying
it through to a consummatory end. In this sense
the esthetic element in experience "means simply
that experiences have attained their fulfillment."
Dewey uses two words, "artistic" and "esthetic";
the former he calls the active, doing side of
experience, the latter the receptive and "going
side" of experience. Yet while the two can be
distinguished from one another, they cannot be
separated in actual developing experience. Thus
a natural termination of such an experience is art,
"an expression of a full experience." This means
that the artistic attitude and method are not
confined to painting, sculpting, "fine" literature,
and the like, but may be part of any sort of
experience. Not only is an esthetic experience
the completion of a course of prior experience,
but it prepares us for subsequent experience.
At the end of L3,15 Dewey returns to the
question of subject matter in its social dimension
and its counterpart in individual experience. He
says that children in the first grade bring some of
the curriculum with them. By this he means that
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something in their past experience can be
connected with school studies. The need for
joining the social and individual in experience
means that an essential task of the school is to
connect the children's own experience (their
already-existing "curriculum") with kinds of
subject matter in school that are socially worth
while.
Dewey takes up the topic of methods in
L3,16. He points out that it is not really a new
topic, being a kind of corollary to what has been
said about experience in general, about the
process of doing in relation to the self and
environment; he aims to make a little more
articulate some things that were said in passing
with respect to other topics. The key to the
nature of method can be found in observing what
takes place "in any worthwhile experience," e.g.,
children in activities outside of school, adults at
work in various occupations. An important thing
is to look for suggestions that increase powers of
observation and independence, rather than to
look for "recipes" on method.
The more
articulate plan of method is found in scientific
method, "tested method." It is the method of
ordinary experience that has been refined and
systematized with special reference to the end of
increasing knowledge. Dewey refers to salient
points in scientific method, beginning with
"getting the problem"; then ideas of working on
the problem grow out of past experience; and
acting to test the ideas. Next he refers to an idea
expressed earlier in the course, that "scientific
knowledge by the action determines the problem
of end and value" (emphasis is on problem). But
knowledge in itself does not tell us what we are
to put knowledge to doing, but requires a sort of
activity, viz. philosophy, that "takes the best
knowledge we have . . . relates that to some
general scheme of directive values and purposes;
the ends themselves not being fixed but being
worked out and developed in the light of the
actual conditions." This means forming
hypotheses and testing them in the light of
available evidence.
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Dewey is saying that a sharp line cannot
be drawn between science and philosophy,
inasmuch as the ideas philosophy suggests in
light of the findings of science themselves need
to be tried out, as far as conditions permit,
according to scientific methods of inquiry. Thus
science results in findings that require a valuing
of them in terms of hypotheses about what they
require of us; and in testing the hypotheses we
generate further conclusions that need the
attention of philosophical valuing.
This is
clearly another example of the idea of continuity
of experience.
Individual and Social: Democracy as a Way of
Life
In L3,17
Dewey
addresses
the
relationship between the individual and the
social, pointing out that certain theories find an
opposition between them. Association, Dewey
argues, is a basic category of existence, even
below the human, below the biological level.
When we consider human beings, we find that
they are nurtured and developed as members of a
community. The problem is not to put the
individual and the social over against one
another, inasmuch as social relations are
inevitable, but to find out how to relate various
individual gifts and capacities to them; and to
find working relationships between different
forms of social organization and individuals.
Genuine individuality, Dewey argues, is itself a
product of social organization. Individuality, in
turn, reacts on social institutions and can aim to
make differences in them.
Dewey emphasizes a point that he had
discussed back in 1899 in School and Society. In
earlier rural, pre-industrial conditions, children
learned habits of responsibility and relationships
between occupations of feeding, clothing, and
sheltering and ways in which the products of
those occupations affected social-individual life
by observing and participating in the society's
occupations along with adults. Schools of the
time tended to take up "academic work" which
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community activities did not engage in. Thus
schools separated themselves from society by
engaging in academic activities while largely
ignoring those of the community. In the forty
years between the beginning of the Laboratory
School in Chicago and 1937, the percentage of
children attending school and particularly the
percentage continuing into secondary education
had increased dramatically. Yet with increasing
industrialization and urbanization, the values
formerly learned by children participating in
community activities found a smaller place in
social life outside the school. At the same time,
for the most part schools have not responded in
ways such that they provide adequate ways of
gaining such values. It is striking how Dewey's
argument in 1937 echoes that of LI, L2, School
and Society, and the work of the Laboratory
School. Here is the way he puts it in L3,17: "if
the growing young are to get any first hand
experience to a very large extent it is the school
that has got to provide them, so that a good deal
of the development of so-called industrial
activities is not so much an immediate and direct
industrial thing as it is to meet a larger human
need of the individuals in getting the kind of
education that the ordinary environment no
longer supplies him."
In Dewey's final lecture in the 1937
course, he discusses education explicitly from a
democratic frame of reference. In contrast to
those who think of democracy mainly as a
political institution, Dewey calls it "a moralsocial ideal," of which political democracy is one
aspect. He quotes the title of Bode's book,
Democracy as a Way of Life, as indicative of his
own view that political democracy is a means to
a wider democracy as a way of life. He points
out that equality of opportunity is a fundamental
ideal in a democratic way of life. Noting the
often-raised criticism of this ideal on the ground
that people are not born equal inasmuch as
heredity makes a difference, Dewey responds by
saying that the advocates of the ideal of equality
meant "that people ought to have equality of
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opportunity no matter what the inequalities in
their natural gifts are." Indeed, he adds, "the
more certain it is that there is inequality of
natural gifts, then the more reason there is for
having equality of opportunity of development."
Dewey goes on to argue that the main
advantage of political democracy "is that it is an
educational procedure." By this he means the
process by which political democracy achieves
its results, including public discussion, with the
aim of settling disputes through inquiry,
consultation, and conference, instead of
imposing authoritarian precepts and rules. Class
distinctions, Dewey points out, set barriers
against a democratic process in that each class
tends "to live within itself instead of
communicating with other groups. He suggests
that certain words are worth thinking about in
this connection, e.g., communication and
community. For there to be communication, a
community needs to exist in which certain aims
are pursued in common. He adds racial groups
to social distinctions as potential barriers or
potential opportunities for community-building
by saying: "The variety, the heterogeneity, of
racial groups ought to contribute to a richer and
fuller life instead of having all differences of
tradition and culture wiped out in the effort to get
uniformity." (So much for the "melting pot," and
so much more for the idea of "cultural
pluralism.")
In discussing the place of vocational
education in a democracy, Dewey argues for a
"larger sense" of it. He means that individuals
should not just be prepared for certain
occupations apart from their participation in
other dimensions of democratic life. Educators
need to get away "from the idea that it is merely
manual skill that is being developed to the idea
that certain attitudes, capacities, forms of
knowledge are being developed that will fit the
individual . . . to choose wisely his line of
occupational contact . . . and to engage
thoughtfully and happily in life." Dewey puts
this idea to work in the concluding remarks of
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the lecture by arguing that school organization
and administration have been democratic less in
practice than in theory; he adds that "it is hard to
see" how students who are taking orders from
others, as well as teachers who are "under more
or less external control by administrators on the
ground that they are not fitted or prepared to
participate in selection and organization of
materials and methods, are going to be effective
educators of individuals for a democratic
society."
Conclusion
Aside from the differences in approach to
the subject of philosophy of education that have
been noted between L3 and its predecessors ~
e.g., beginning the lectures by discussing
philosophy and philosophy of education, not
offering a formal definition of education —
emphases held in common with LI, L2, and
Democracy and Education are striking. Among
them are the nature of interrelationships between
organism and environment, between individual
and social, between child and curriculum; the
need to make democracy work as a way of life;
the distinction between ends-in-view and ends
achieved; and the necessity for life in schools to
acknowledge the place of informal out-of-school
activities in shaping the formal school subjects.
At the same time, Dewey had
experienced much in the four decades since LI
and L2 and the two decades since Democracy
and Education; and in 1937 a somewhat different
world was very much with him. While in the
earlier lectures and writings Dewey had taken
care to point out the obstacles to a wider bringing
to life of his educational ideas, in 1937 it is
almost as if many of those obstacles had become
engrained as part of an American way of life.
World War I and its consequences, the economic
depression of the 1930s, the threat to democracy
by totalitarian states, and the hold of absolutistic
values and standards on people's minds, all
weighed heavily on Dewey's insistence that if
one is not a philosophical absolutist one cannot
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be an absolutist for peace, and his remarks about
the
undemocratic
organization
and
administration of schools and the authoritarian
way in which teachers and students are treated.
It will not do to attempt to characterize
Dewey in those slippery terms, optimist or
pessimist. He clearly has not lost hope in the
possibilities of human beings learning how to
make their own values and to test them by their
own experience. Yet he seems more mindful in
1937 than in 1896, 1899, and 1916 of the
recalcitrance of real obstacles to that kind of
learning and testing.
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